“Our first strike was on May 26, 1999, with our hands tied, as we were instructed not to cross the Line of Control (LoC),” recalls Air Marshal Anjan Kumar Gogoi PVSM AVSM VSM (retired) while narrating the role of Indian Air Force in Kargil operations. Twenty years on, Air Marshal Gogoi calls it India’s ‘big tactical victory with huge strategic implications’.
How it started
“At a time when then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee took a bus to Lahore in February 1999, the infiltrators were already sneaking up the hills. From what I gather, they started in October-November 1998. India got to know of it only when some shepherds reported to the army about some of our posts being occupied by unknown people. The Pakistanis were able to take over 143 posts because there were no Indian forces there. They entrenched themselves, kept their supply lines going till we discovered on May 3, 1999,” says Air Marshal Gogoi.
“Actually they were soldiers of the Pakistan army in
Salwar Kameez, though Pakistan called them Mujahideen. So, when we retaliated with our Air Force, they could not do the same, because all the while they kept calling them Mujahideen or militants. It was not a typical war scenario in which the classical approach to warfighting is taken,” he adds. Role played by Indian Air Force
Remaining confident that India would have won the 1962 Sino-Indian war had they used the Air Force, Air Marshal Gogoi says that even during Kargil operations, the government decided to use Airpower after a little delay - only on May 25, 1999.
“The Air Force was not used because there has been traditional thinking in India that involving the Air Force will escalate the whole thing.”
The decision taken by the Indian government to use the Air Force in Kargil operations played an important role in the ultimate victory. Never before in the military history had an Air Force engaged ground targets at such high altitudes, well defended by air defence weapons. The Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Army worked in close coordination, and Airpower inflicted heavy damage on the intruders apart from reducing casualties on the ground.
“The effective application of airpower saved further casualties. The air operations deprived the intruders of essential supplies and it did cast a demoralizing spell on the enemy commanders and troops, affecting their will to fight. As a result of this morale capitulation, the time frame to achieve the objectives through ground operations was considerably reduced. With the target area just 5-12 km from the LoC, it took a high degree of precision flying to avoid crossing the LoC and unleashing the lethal arsenal at the Pakistani intruders,” narrates Air Marshal Gogoi.
Air Marshal Anjan Kumar Gogoi receiving the then Defence Minister George Fernandes.
‘No Air Force in the world has fired in those heights’ For the Indian Air Force, it was said to be ‘a learning process’ to fire from those heights in the difficult terrain.
“The average height of the mountains in Kargil ranges from about 5000-6000 feet, going up to about 20,000 feet above sea level. There are some hills which are bare and some snowbound. It is very difficult terrain, and the Pakistanis were sitting on top, occupying our posts. In such a scenario, if you tell the Air Force not to cross the LoC, it meant that we could not attack from a certain direction - because after firing, we would have to cross the LOC due to the large radius of turn, there is no other way,” explains Air marshal Gogoi.
“20 years back, we did not have the required number of smart bombs, we mainly had dumb bombs, where the accuracy is much larger. If we used just dumb bombs, then the Circular Error Probable (CEP) is quite large. That is at sea level and at those altitudes even larger. We had never fired at those heights. No Air Force in the world has fired at those heights."
"If the target is at 15,000 feet, to release the bomb, you are at 25,000 feet- you make a dive, fire and then you pull out, remaining careful to not go into one of those hills or cross the LOC. You had to learn this technique of firing from those heights - you didn’t know what would be the aerodynamics of the bomb, and how it will fly at those heights. The decision not to cross the LOC and the requirement of achieving greater accuracy led to the use of smart bombs – the Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) at that time were available with the Mirage 2000 aircraft only, and that too, the actual integration had not been completed. We had to do it within those days,” recalls Air Marshal Gogoi.
Types of Mission Flown
The fighters flew 1730 sorties, the transport aircraft flew 3427, and the helicopters flew 2474 sorties in Kargil Operations.
Around 25 percent of the total strike force at the disposal of the Western Air Command was utilized during Kargil Operations, which delivered a serious blow to the morale of the enemy. The IAF aircrafts carried out about 6,500 sorties for strike, reconnaissance, evacuation, transportation and logistic support.
The MiG-21 aircraft, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and helicopter gunships had struck insurgent positions. The initial strikes had the Air Defense versions of the MiG-21s, and later MiG-29s provided the air defence cover while also keeping Pakistan's F-16s in check. Subsequently, the Mirage 2000, deemed the best aircraft in the IAF inventory for its capability of optimum performance in high-altitude conditions was used extensively, even with the dumb bombs.
Four crew members of a Mi-17 helicopter unit had sacrificed their lives in the perilous heights of Tololing on May 28, 1999.
“When we were cleared on May 25, we first decided to use the helicopters. There were numerous missions flown by Mi-17 gunships, which were initially used in an offensive role. However, it was realized that the battlefield had a high density of Stingers or Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS), and subsequently, the role assigned to the helicopter fleet was reviewed,” says Air Marshal Gogoi.
Why Helicopters were not used
“I was then the Station Commander at Suratgarh, and the attack helicopter squadron is based there. We were ordered to practice firing from 5km altitude, which is around 16,000 feet. We had never fired from a helicopter at that height. We used to carry the Shtrum missile which had a range of about 5-6km, and we practised firing. After some time, we realized that the Pakistanis were having Stingers, and the altitude to which it is effective is up to about 30,000 feet. It was a very tricky situation. No Air Force had faced a situation like this. So, it was only the fighters – ultimately, the Mirage 2000s with smart bombs were used extensively in the operations."
"We had to launch recce sorties to identify the latitude and longitude of the targets, keeping in mind the terrain and other factors. A lot of Jaguar and Canberra sorties were flown. Those days we did not have digital cameras, but only film-based cameras. And it was a huge process to have a photo interpreter identifying gun positions or logistic nodes. But ultimately, we were able to identify it all – Muntho Dhalo was a big logistics base, in which our attack was so effective that the whole base got destroyed,” recalls Air Marshal Gogoi.
On May 27, 1999, Group Captain Kambampati Nachiketa from No. 9 Squadron of IAF flew a mission to the Batalik sector on his Mig 27 fighter aircraft but had to eject due to engine failure. He was the first and only prisoner of war of the 1999 Kargil war. Squadron leader Ajay Ahuja of No. 17 Squadron, who was on a photo recce mission in his MiG 21 was struck by Pakistani air defence missile.
Turning the tide of Kargil Ops: Mirage 2000
The receding snowline in June laid bare the camouflaged enemy positions, opening them to non-stop day and night attacks by the Mirage 2000 and, subsequently by all aircraft. The Mirage 2000 was looked upon as the aircraft that turned the tide of the Kargil Operations. The fighter jet initially armed with the dumb bombs, and later with LGBs, repeatedly struck the heavily defended enemy posts. On June 16, the enemy’s primary supply depot was pinpointed at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik sector. The next day, the Mirage 2000s destroyed the Muntho Dhalo administrative and logistics base of the enemy using the 1,000-pound dumb bombs that were dropped using the onboard Computer Controlled Release Point (CCRP) sighting technique.
“It was a Mirage attack at Muntho Dhalo- using a combination of LGBs and dumb bombs. We estimate there must have been at least 100-150 casualties that very day in the area,” Air Marshal Gogoi recalls with a sense of pride, explaining how the supply chains of the enemy were struck tactically at several locations, leaving them completely isolated in the battlefield.
Air Marshal Anjan Kumar Gogoi with the missile crew.
Withdrawal of the enemy
According to Air Marshal Gogoi, in addition to the relentless air and ground assault by the Indian Forces and heavy Pakistani losses, it was political and international pressure that forced the withdrawal of the enemy.
“When I was in service, I used to curse the decision - for the order of not crossing the LoC, but as I went higher up the ranks, and today, I realise that the stature of India has gone up in the international eyes to a big extent. There has been so much of
neech harkat from the Pakistani side, but we still maintained our calm and resolve of not escalating further.” Busy hours at Air Force Station
Fondly remembering his time at the Suratgarh Air Force Station, Air Marshal Gogoi recalls the activities that went on at the base during that time.
“Initially, the station geared up for air defence missions as per the instructions from Command Headquarters. In peacetime, all ammunition would be stocked at the bomb dump. A lot of operational assets are within the Station. When orders were given, there were some units which had to move out and some units that flew in, and we had to host them. The initial 72 hours was mayhem –but orderly, because we had practised for this, got inspected, examined and marked for the process.
It was a bundle of activity. We had a 3-tier ground defence plan - the Home Guards, Territorial Army and Defence Security Guards. What’s fantastic is that the families, even the ladies would form groups to guard the perimeter. People volunteered to do this, quite unbelievable!” ‘Biggest Boon’
“The biggest boon of the Kargil War as far as India is concerned is the ‘Kargil Committee Report’. We really woke up and realized that we needed to upgrade our systems. Fortunately for me, after Suratgarh, I was posted to Air HQs – and I was in offensive operations. I was given the task to sort out our War Wastage Reserve (WWR), which is the reserve of armament and ammunition that one must have to fight the required length of battle as mentioned in the Raksha Mantri’s Operational Directive. We have to stock accordingly, and it is a massive exercise. During the war, we got a lot of stuff from Israel. After the war, the arms and ammunition requirement for the Air Force alone at that point in time came to about Rs 60,000 crore. At the time, we only had 10 percent smart weapons against the 50-50 theory today of having both smart and dumb weapons. And it’s very expensive,” says Air Marshal Gogoi who had served the Indian Air Force for 40 years.
Encouraging the younger generation to join Indian Air Force, Air Marshal Gogoi calls it an ‘extremely challenging’ profession.“Every profession is an opportunity to serve the nation one way or the other. But joining the Armed Forces is unique. It is a fantastic opportunity to serve the country. It is challenging, and when you launch a mission in support of our national security objectives, it is a different ballgame. It is a matter of life and death, not for you alone but for so many other people.”